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Abstract
Dividend equilibrium, dened by Aumann and Dreze (1986), is one of the most general competitive
equilibrium concepts for the market, including satiated consumers. Konovalov (2005) shows a core
equivalence theorem to the dividend equilibrium using the concept of rejective core. Konovalov's
argument, however, is based on the setting of an atomless large economy and the core limit problem
for dividend equilibrium remains unsolved. In a previous paper, Urai and Murakami (2015), we
provided a generalization of the Debreu-Scarf core limit theorem (Debreu and Scarf 1963) for monetary
overlapping generations economies under an extended concept of replica core allocation. In this paper,
we show that the concept and method also provide a core limit theorem for economies with satiation.
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1 Introduction
Dividend equilibrium or equilibrium with slack, dened by Aumann and Dreze (1986), is one of the most
general competitive equilibrium concepts for the market, including satiated consumers. For an economy
with satiated consumers, a competitive equilibrium might fail to exist, and \the existence of an equilibrium
can be restored if we give consumers appropriate extra amounts of income to spend" (Mas-Colell 1992).
Konovalov (2005) shows a core equivalence theorem to the dividend equilibrium using the concept of
rejective core. Konovalov's argument, however, is based on the setting of an atomless large economy
and the core limit problem for dividend equilibrium remains unsolved.1 In a previous paper, Urai and
Murakami (2015), we provided a generalization of the Debreu-Scarf core limit theorem (Debreu and Scarf
1963) for monetary overlapping generations economies under an extended concept of replica core allocation.
In this paper, we show that the concept and method also provide a core limit theorem for economies with
satiation.
2 The Model
We use R as the set of real numbers. Let I be the non-empty nite set of agent indices and let K be
the non-empty nite set of commodity indices. Each agent i 2 I is represented by (%i; !i), where %i
is the preference relation on consumption set RK+ for each agent i 2 I satisfying reexivity, transitivity,
completeness, continuity, and strict convexity.2 The preferences, therefore, can be represented by utility
functions. In addition, for each agent, the preference relation is allowed to be satiated and is locally
non-satiated at every point except for the maximal satiation point that is unique, if it exists, under strict
convexity.
To prove a core limit theorem for an economy with satiation, we use the next assumption as one of the
simplest ways for ensuring the resource relatedness condition among agents:
(SNS: socially non-satiated preference conguration)
For each commodity k 2 K and allocation x = (xi)i2I , there exists at least one agent i 2 I such
that i's utility strictly increases as i's consumption amount of commodity k strictly increases.
The initial endowment of each i 2 I is represented by !i and is assumed to be an element of RK++. For
economy E = (I; f(%i; !i)gi2I), if allocation (xi 2 RK+ )i2I satisesX
i2I
xi =
X
i2I
!i;(1)
we say that (xi)i2I is feasible.
2.1 Dividend Equilibria
We dene the dividend equilibrium allocation for economy E = (I; f(%i; !i)gi2I) based on a feasible
allocation that establishes the utility maximization for each agent under given price vector p = (pk)k2K 2
RK+ and non-negative dividends d = (di)i2I 2 RI+. The list of price vector p 2 RK+ , dividends d and
1 Aumann and Dreze (1986) gives a limit characterization for the dividend equilibrium using a Sharpley value, but fails
to provide a limit theorem based on such game-theoretic solution concepts as core.
2 We use RK instead of R]K to represent ]K-dimensional vector space since the set can be regarded as the set of functions
on K to R.
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feasible allocation (xi )i2I is called a dividend equilibrium for E, if for each i 2 I, xi is the %i-greatest
element in the following set:
fxi 2 RK j p  xi5 p  !i + di g:(2)
A dividend equilibrium is also called an equilibrium with slack, and we denote the set of all dividend
equilibrium allocations for economy E by SWalras(E).
The dividend equilibrium, which is one of the most general equilibrium concepts for a market economy,
allows preferences to be satiated. It includes the coupons equilibrium under price rigidities and quantity
rationing (see Dreze and Muller 1980 and Aumann and Dreze 1986). The coupons equilibrium is associated
with the problem of quantity adjustments in the temporary equilibrium of Grandmont (1977).3 Aumann
and Dreze (1986) pointed out that the coupons equilibrium can be identied with a dividend equilibrium
by regarding a xed price as a 1-dimensional additional constraint and considering (]K   1)-dimensional
modied commodity space with non-negative dividends.
3 Core and Replica Economy
In this paper, the core in the replica economy has special roles and meanings. First, let us dene the
concepts of the standard core and the rejective core of Konovalov (2005). Then we provide the concept
of re-negotiation in replica economies that plays an essential role in proving the core limit theorem of this
paper.
3.1 Core
A coalition in economy E = (I; f(%i; !i)gi2I) is a set of agents S  I. Feasible allocation x is said to be
the core allocation if there is no coalition S, and no feasible allocation y satises the following conditions:
(a)
P
i2S yi =
P
i2S !i.
(b) yi%xi for all i 2 S and yi  xi for at least one i 2 S.
We call the set of all core allocations the core of economy E and denote it by Core(E). Allocation x is said
to be blocked by coalition S if conditions (a) and (b) hold. When we strengthen condition (b) to condition
(b0) yi  xi for all i 2 S, the set of feasible allocations that cannot be blocked by such a coalition is called
a weak core and is denoted byWcore(E).
3.2 Rejective Core
Konovalov (2005) shows the equivalence theorem between the competitive equilibrium and the rejective
core in the large economy. The concept of rejective core can easily be translated for nite economies. For
economy E = (I; f(%i; !i)gi2I), feasible allocation x is said to be a rejective core allocation if there is no
coalition S with partition (S1; S2), and no feasible allocation y satises the following conditions:
4
3 For a dividend equilibrium allocation, the budget constraint for each agent is dened as (2). On the other hand, for a
coupons equilibrium allocation, the budget constraint is dened as fxi 2 RK j p  xi = p  !i and q  xi5 q  !i + cig under a
certain xed price, p 2 RK+ , a coupons price vector, q 2 RK , and a coupons endowment, ci 2 R.
4 Since Konovalov (2005) treats the equivalence theorem in the limit, he uses only strict preferences and his denition of
rejective core is based on the weak core concept, and condition (d) is weakened as the above (b0). In this paper, we consider
the standard core concept of Debreu and Scarf (1963).
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(c)
P
i2S yi =
P
i2S1 !i +
P
i2S2 xi.
(d) yi%xi for all i 2 S and yi  xi for at least one i 2 S.
(e) yi%!i for all i 2 I n S.
We call the set of all rejective core allocations the rejective core of economy E. Note that if S2 = ;, we
can neglect condition (e) since it is always possible to dene yi as !i for all i 2 I n S, so the denition of
rejective core allocation becomes that of the standard core allocation. When allocation x is blocked by
coalition S in the sense of the standard core, it is also blocked by S = S1 (with S2 = ;) in the sense of
the rejective core. Hence a rejective core allocation is also a core allocation.
3.3 Replica Economy and Re-Negotiation Replica Economy
In Urai and Murakami (2015), based on the concept of re-negotiation in replica economies, we showed
the core equivalence theorem for monetary general equilibria in overlapping-generations economies. Now,
we introduce the concept of re-negotiation in a replica economy to this paper and give the necessary
settings for our arguments.
For economy E = (I; f(%i; !i)gi2I), En represents the n-fold replica economy with n-times replica
agents of economy E. For each feasible allocation x = (xi 2 RK+ )i2I for economy E = (I; f(%i; !i)gi2I),
we denote by E(x) an economy where initial endowment allocation ! = (!i)i2I is replaced by x = (xi)i2I .
The dierence between E(x) and E is only the initial endowment and the other settings like preferences
are identical. Then, we can write E = E(!). Consider the following replica economy,
Em(!) En(x);(3)
which consists of all the members of the m-fold replica economy of E(!) and the n-fold replica economy
of E(x) for non-negative integers m and n. We call this economy, Em(!)  En(x), the (m + n)-fold re-
negotiation replica economy (RNR economy) of E. For allocation y of economy E(x), yn represents the
n-fold replica allocation of y for n-fold replica economy En(x) such that each replica agent is assigned the
same allocation under y in original economy E(x). In the same way, for common allocation y in economies
E(!) and E(x), ym+n represents the (m + n)-fold replica allocation of y for (m + n)-fold RNR economy
Em(!)En(x) such that each replica agent is assigned the same allocation under y in original economies
E(!) or E(x).
4 Re-Negotiation Replica Core Limit Theorem
In our main theorem, we show that the core of RNR economy Em(!)En(x) converges to the dividend
equilibria. Before its proof, we check that the theorem includes an equivalence theorem with a rejective
core.
Lemma: Let x be a feasible allocation of economy E, let m be a positive integer, and let n
be a non-negative integer. If (m+ n)-fold replica allocation xm+n is a rejective core allocation
of (m + n)-fold replica economy Em+n, then xm+n is a core allocation of (m + n)-fold RNR
economy Em(!)En(x). The lemma is also true for cases with a weak core and a weak rejective
core.
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Proof : For feasible allocation x0 of economy E, if there exists agent j with !j j x0j , x0 is blocked by
the coalition consisting of the single agent j in the sense of standard core blocking denition. Hence, the
(m+ n)-fold replica allocation of x0 cannot be a core allocation of the RNR economy Em(!) En(x) nor
a rejective core allocation of replica economy Em+n. Thus we can assume that the allocation x of the
lemma satises xi%i !i for all i 2 I, i.e., the individual rationality.
For any m= 1 and n= 0, assume that (m+n)-fold allocation xm+n is blocked by coalition S in Em(!)
En(x), where x is feasible and satisfying the individual rationality in E. Coalition S is a union of S1 and
S2 where S1 is the set of agents belonging to the m-fold replica economy E
m(!) and S2 is the set of agents
belonging to the n-fold replica economy En(x). Let N be the set of all agents belonging to the RNR
economy Em(!)  En(x). Consider feasible allocation y of Em(!)  En(x) where the agents belonging
to the coalition S are assigned the blocking allocation and the lest agents belonging to N n S are simply
assigned the initial endowments !i if i is a member of E
m(!) or xi if i is a member of E
n(x).
First, for the coalition S = S1 [ S2, by regarding this S, S1 and S2 as the coalition S and the partition
(S1; S2) in the denition of the rejective core, we can check that conditions (c) and (d) hold. Next, for
each agent i 2 N nS of the economy Em(!), yi = !i and yi%i !i holds evidently. For each agent i 2 N nS
of the economy En(x), yi = xi and yi%i !i also follows from the individual rationality of x. Hence, the
third condition (e) of the denition of the rejective core is also satised.
From the above arguments, the allocation y blocks the replica allocation xm+n of the replica economy
Em+n. We can prove the lemma for cases with the weak core and weak rejective core in exactly the same
way. 
From the lemma, if the replica allocation is a rejective core allocation, it becomes the core allocation of
the RNR economy. Thus we can have the replica core equivalence theorem of the rejective core by showing
the following core limit theorem of an RNR economy.
Theorem 1: Feasible allocation x for E belongs to SWalras(E) i its (m + n)-fold replica allocation
belongs to Core(Em(!)  En(x)) for every m= 1 and n= 0.5 The theorem is also true for cases with a
weak core and a weak rejective core.
Proof : [Necessity] Let x = (xi)i2I be a feasible allocation for economy E = (I; f(%i; !i)gi2I) such that
every (m+ n)-fold replica allocation of x belongs to Core(Em(!)En(x)) for all m= 1 and n= 0. Dene
for each i 2 I,  i as  i = fiz1i + (1   i)z2i j z1i + !i i xi; z2i + xi i xi; 05i5 1g  RK . Then,
take the convex hull   of nite union
S
i2I  i  RK . Since  i is convex for every i and is non-empty for
at least one agent by the SNS condition,   becomes a non-empty convex set. Let I 0 be the set of agents
i 2 I such that  i 6= ;, we have
S
i2I0  i =  . Then   consists of all vectors z that can be written as
z =
P
i2I0 i(iz
1
i + (1  i)z2i ), with i= 0,
P
i2I0 i = 1, where z
1
i + !i i xi and z2i + xi i xi for each
i 2 I 0.
We will show 0 =2   in the similar way as in the proof of Debreu and Scarf (1963; Theorem 3). Let
us suppose that 0 belongs to  . Then, one can write
P
i2I0 i(iz
1
i + (1   i)z2i ) = 0, with i= 0 andP
i2I0 i = 1, where z
1
i + !i i xi and z2i + xi i xi for each i 2 I 0. For suciently large , let a1i and
a2i be the smallest integers greater than ii and i(1  i) respectively. Also, let J be the set of all
5 In the case with standard core, the proof of suciency part strongly depends on the strict convexity of preferences, i.e.,
the fact that indierence curves are thin. However, in the case with weak core, the suciency part can be proved without
the strict convexity of preferences.
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i 2 I 0 for which i > 0. For each i 2 J , we dene z1i as iia1i z
1
i , and z
2
i as
i(1 i)
a2i
z2i . Observe that
z1i + !i belongs to the segment [!i; z
1
i + !i] and z
2
i + xi belongs to the segment [xi; z
2
i + xi].
J1 (i 6= 0)
J2 (1  i 6= 0)1  i = 0
i = 0
Figure 1: J = J1 [ J2 with i > 0 and 05i5 1.
Let J1 be the set of i 2 J such that i 6= 0, and J2 be the set of i 2 J such that 1  i 6= 0. Note that
J1 [ J2 = J (see Figure 1). For i 2 J1, z1i +!i tends to z1i +!i, and for i 2 J2, z2i + xi tends to z2i + xi
as  tends to innity. The continuity assumption on preferences implies that z1i + !i i xi for all i 2 J1
and z2i + xi i xi for all i 2 J2 for all  suciently large. Select one of such . Then we have
0 = 
X
i2J
i(iz
1
i + (1  i)z2i ) =
X
i2J
i(iz
1
i + (1  i)z2i )(4)
=
X
i2J1nJ2
iiz
1
i +
X
i2J1\J2
i(iz
1
i + (1  i)z2i ) +
X
i2J2nJ1
i(1  i)z2i
=
X
i2J1nJ2
a1i z
1
i +
X
i2J1\J2
(a1i z
1
i + a
2
i z
2
i ) +
X
i2J2nJ1
a2i z
2
i :
Let us consider the RNR economy Em(!)  En(x) with m = maxi2J a1i and n = maxi2J a2i . Take
the coalition composed of a1i replica members of i for each i 2 J1 to each one of whom we assign z1i +!i,
and a2i replica members of i for each i 2 J2 to each one of whom we assign z2i + xi. This coalition blocks
the allocation (xi) as equation (4) and the fact that z1i + !i i xi for each i 2 J1 and z2i + xi i xi
for all i 2 J2 show.6 This is a contradiction to the denition of Core(Em(!)  En(x)). Hence, we have
established 0 =2  .
Let  be the set of prices such that  = fp 2 RK \ j p  z= 0 for all z 2  g, where  represents the
standard (]K   1)-dimensional simplex of RK , i.e.,  = fp j p = (p1; p2;    ; pK) 2 RK+ ;
PK
k=1 pk = 1g.
Set  is closed in RK+ and is non-empty since there exists p 2 RK n f0g by the separating hyperplane
theorem.7
From p 2  and !i 2 RK++, we have p  !i > 0 for all i 2 I. If a price of some commodity k 2 K,
pk, is zero, we have a contradiction as follows. From the SNS condition, there exist some agent who
demands the commodity k at x. Then we call one such agent as i. Consider rst the case that p  xi =
0. Then, since p  !i > 0, let  2 R++ be suciently small value such that p  !i > pk. A vector
xi + (0;    ; 0;+; 0;    ; 0)   !i such that xi + (0;    ; 0;+; 0;    ; 0) is strictly preferred to xi, where
6 This is the only part that the proof depends on the denition of the core. Since in the coalition, a1i replica members of
i for each i 2 J1 and a2i replica members of i for each i 2 J2, the utility of each member increases strictly, we can easily
check that this proof can also follow in the case of the weak core.
7 For example, consider any element z 2   such that i = 0 for each i. For the element z 2  , in the non-negative direction
of every coordinate, there exist xi + zi + e
k that is preferred to xi + zi by some agent, and there also exist z + e
k 2   from
the SNS condition. Note that ek is a unit vector ek = (0;    ; 0; 1; 0;    ; 0) of RK where the k-th coordinate is 1. Hence,
from the convexity of  ,   has interior points. For the separating hyperplane theorem, see, for example, Schaefer (1971; p.46,
Theorem 3.1).
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+ > 0 is the k-th coordinate of a commodity, will not be non-negatively supported by p. This is a
contradiction to the denition of  . Secondly, if p  xi > 0, we have pk = 0 and there exist a commodity
k0 6= k such that pk0 > 0 and xik0 > 0. Then, a vector xi + (0;    ; 0;+; 0;    ; 0; ; 0;    ; 0) such that
xi + (0;    ; 0;+; 0;    ; 0; ; 0;    ; 0) is strictly preferred to xi,8 where + > 0 is the k-th coordinate of
a commodity and   < 0 is the k0-th coordinate of a commodity, will not be non-negatively supported by
p. This is a contradiction to the denition of  . Hence, p 2 RK++ holds for each p 2 . Let us choose one
of such p arbitrarily and denote it by p.
For each i 2 I 0, since xi i xi means that xi   !i and xi   xi belong to  i, we have p  xi= p  !i and
p xi= p  xi. Moreover, for each i 2 I 0, since p is non-negative and the local non-satiation holds on this
point xi, we can take xi arbitrarily near to xi. Then we have p
  xi= p  !i.
Dene di = 0 as di = p  xi  p !i for all i 2 I 0. Then, we have p  xi = p !i+ di . In addition, since
!i 2 RK++ for all i 2 I and p is strictly positive, p  !i > 0. Since xi i xi means that p  xi= p  xi,
the continuity of preference together with p  !i + di > 0 implies that for every i 2 I 0, xi is an individual
maxima under price p and dividend di .
For agent i 2 I nI 0, note that xi is a satiation point, and we can dene di as follows. Let I 00 be the set of
all agents belonging to I nI 0 such that p  xi p !i > 0. Then, we can dene di = 0 as di = p  xi p !i
for each i 2 I 00. For the other agents, i.e., for each i 2 I n (I 0 [ I 00) with p  xi   p  !i5 0, dene di as
di = 0. From these denitions, xi satises the budget constraint and is an individual maxima under price
p and dividen di . Hence, allocation x is an element of SWalras(E).
[Suciency] Let x = (xi )i2I be an element of SWalras(E) under price p and non-negative dividends
d. Assume that S = S1 [ S2 is a nite coalition of Em(!)  En(x) for some m= 1 and n= 0 blocking
the (m+ n)-fold replica allocation of x, where S1 is a coalition in Em(!) and S2 is a coalition in En(x).
Then, by denition, there is an allocation (xi)i2S such that
P
i2S xi =
P
i2S1 !i +
P
i2S2 x

i , xi%i xi for
all i 2 S and xj j xj for some j 2 S. Note that the equilibrium price p is strictly positive under the SNS
condition of preferences.9 Hence, the equilibrium condition means that xj j xj implies p  xj > p  xj .
In addition, for each agent i 2 S with xi%i xi , if p  xi < p  xi , we have xi 6= xi . Then, all the points
belong to the segment [xi; x

i ] other than xi and x

i are strictly preferred to x

i from the strict convexity of
the preference and satises the budget constraint. This contradicts to the assumption that x is a dividend
equilibrium allocation. Hence, p xi= p xi for all i 2 S and p xj > p xj at least for j 2 S. It follows
that p  (Pi2S1 xi +Pi2S2 xi) > p Pi2S1 xi + p Pi2S2 xi = p  (Pi2S1 xi +Pi2S2 !i), a contradicts
to
P
i2S xi =
P
i2S1 x

i +
P
i2S2 !i.
[The Case with Weak Core] For cases with the weak core, the necessity part of the proof is completely
the same as we note in footnote 6. For the suciency part, we can show the same kind of contradiction
without using the strict convexity of preferences, since the condition, p  xj j p  xj , for agent j holds
for all agents belonging to S. 
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